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INTRODUCTION 
The National Land Committee (NLC) and the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 
(PLAAS) of the University of the Western Cape have been funded by DfID UK 
(Department for International Development) to undertake a process of community 
consultation around the Communal Land Rights bill. The project began in August 2003 
and has engaged in consultation with representatives from over 90 rural communities in 
the different provinces of South Africa.1  Various rural non-governmental organisations 
have been partners in the process of convening rural consultation meetings.  These 
including AFRA, AnCRA, Masifunde, Nkuzi, TRAC North West, and TRALSO.  
 
This submission is made on behalf of the joint PLAAS/NLC project and reflects the 
lessons the project has learnt about the bill during the consultation process.  Land NGOs 
and rural communities will make their own submissions directly to the portfolio 
committee. 
 
The submission is divided into various sections, being: 
 
1 The need for tenure legislation 
2 The problems with the bill 
Ø Rural people have no say in irrevocable decisions that affect their land 
rights 
Ø People are given no choice about who will administer their land rights – 
instead traditional councils are imposed on them 
Ø The bill does not protect human rights in communal areas 
Ø The bill entrenches discrimination against rural women   
Ø The bill is not serious about unpacking overlapping rights 
Ø The content of land rights is not clear 
Ø Service delivery and development becomes more difficult  
Ø The bill cannot be implemented at scale – what will happen in the interim? 
3 The paradigm adopted by the bill 
4 The solution  
  An alternative paradigm 
  A better process 
 
                                               
1  See “Community views on the Communal Land Rights bill” by Aninka Claassens for an account and list 
of consultations that took place before July 2003.  PLAAS Research Report no 15.  August 2003. 
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1 THE NEED FOR TENURE LEGISLATION 
 
Tenure legislation is urgently necessary.  There are serious problem in the communal 
areas in the ex-homeland provinces.  These areas are characterised by severe poverty, 
overcrowding and isolation from economic growth and opportunity.  One of the issues 
that inhibits development, is the lack of clarity about the status of land rights in 
communal areas.  Who has what rights?  Who must agree to changes?  Who has the legal 
authority to transact land?   One of the consequences of this confusion is that the people 
who actually use and occupy the land are often pushed aside and dispossessed when 
development and land transactions do take place.  Others, purporting to act on their 
behalf, take the money and run.   
 
The underlying confusion about the status of land rights, has been exacerbated by the 
breakdown of the land administration system in the ex-homeland provinces.  In most 
provinces nobody has the legal power to allocate land rights, and there is no budget or 
staff to survey sites, maintain grazing camps, enforce dipping regimes or control the 
plunder of common property resources such as medicinal herbs and forests.  Double and 
disputed land allocations are the order of the day, illegal and informal land sales are 
increasingly common and stock theft has reached alarming proportions.  There is a 
serious and deepening crisis concerning land rights and land allocations in communal 
areas, which is impacting negatively on rural poverty.  One of the inevitable results is that 
investors and formal and financial institutions avoid these areas.  Local people find it 
almost impossible to raise loans for businesses, or to access housing subsidies.   
 
Another problem in rural areas relates to infrastructural development and service 
provision.  Local government planning and service delivery interventions are often 
thwarted or delayed by chiefs refusing to “release” land for development projects.  There 
is no integration of the planning and service delivery role of local government with the 
systems of authority over land and land management in communal areas.  It is very 
difficult to carry out development when the structure responsible for development is 
different from the structure that makes decisions about land.  This stand-off has been 
exacerbated by the break-down of the old land administration system and the deepening 
chaos and confusion concerning land rights in communal areas.   
 
A legislative intervention is urgently necessary - to clarify and secure the land rights of 
the people who occupy and use the land – and thereby to facilitate development and 
economic activity.  Because of forced removals and the legacy of the Land Acts, we are 
faced with conflicting and overlapping  land rights in most communal areas.  Thus tenure 
reform must also “unpack” conflicting rights if it is not to simply entrench past 
dispossession.   
 
A viable and sustainable system of recording, enforcing and protecting land rights is 
urgently necessary – in other words a proper land administration system.  Another 
challenge is to find a way of articulating a system of secure rights – supported by a 
sustainable land administration system - with local government development and service 
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delivery functions – so that development in rural areas can be expedited, and disentangled 
from the morass it currently finds itself in. 
 
Developing tenure legislation is a very difficult job to get right – especially given the 
legacy of intractable problems inherited from apartheid.  Unfortunately the Communal 
Land Rights is not good enough.  It is fatally flawed in various ways.  If it were enacted 
in its present form, it would exacerbate, rather than ameliorate the problems in rural 
areas.   
 
2  PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMUNAL LAND RIGHTS BILL 
 
RURAL PEOPLE HAVE NO SAY IN IRREVOCABLE DECISIONS THAT  
AFFECT THEIR LAND RIGHTS 
 
Transfer of title is an irrevocable step, which cannot be undone except by 
expropriation.  This bill provides for the transfer of title of communal land, yet the people 
and communities whose land is at issue, are not consulted about whether they want title 
to be transferred, which land will be transferred, to whom, and what units of land will be 
created.  
 
Section 18 sets out that the Minister will decide on “the location and extent of the land to 
be transferred to a community or person” (18(2)).  The Minister will also decide on 
whether to transfer the whole of a communal area to a specific community, or to sub-
divide it into portions and individualise it (18(3)).  Or s/he may transfer part of the land to 
the community and keep part of it for the state, including a municipality. 
 
The people whose land rights are at issue, are not consulted at any stage.  Nor is their 
consent required to the cutting up of their land, the excision of parts, or to its transfer.  
The best they can do is “participate” in the Land Rights Enquiry that precedes the 
Minister’s decision (16).   
 
However the terms of participation in a Land Rights Enquiry are not spelled out.  The 
Enquirer is not required to establish or report on community views concerning the 
proposed transfers.  Nor does the bill require that an Enquirer’s report be made public, 
nor that those affected can object to the report.  This is very material as the Minister’s 
determinations are based on the report of the Land Rights Enquiry (18(1)) 
 
The only way in which those affected could have stopped a land transfer would have 
been to refuse to adopt and register community rules.  Without registered community 
rules the community cannot be a “juristic person” thereby capable of owning land in 
perpetuity.  However even this avenue is closed by section 19 (5) which enables the 
Minister to simply adapt pro forma rules and apply these to any community that “fails to 
adopt and have community rules registered.”   
 
Previous versions of the bill required the Land Rights Enquirer to establish and report on 
the views of the community with regard to proposed land transfers.  They also required 
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majority community consent prior to transfer.  In earlier versions the Minister did not 
initiate transfers, communities requested transfers. 
 
In the current version, however, the entire process is driven by the Minister and there is 
no opportunity for communities or people who oppose transfers, or the terms of transfers 
to stop them.  Why this about-face?  The reason appears to be that the drafters are aware 
of the inexorable nature of the disputes concerning boundaries, identity and power that 
land transfers would elicit – and that if the bill opens any space for community 
consultation the process will unravel and get locked in endless delays and disputes. 
 
The issue is not only that of disputed boundaries between communities, for example the 
disputed boundaries between Tribal Authorities in Kwa Zulu Natal, is also one of 
disputed boundaries within communities, for example some groups were given 
compensatory land for forced removals but put under the jurisdiction of local chiefs.  
They now object to their compensatory land being incorporated into the property of the 
“host” community and their land being administered by Tribal Authorities that they 
reject.  Furthermore there are people who dispute their identity as tribal “subjects” they 
assert that their land rights are independent and derive from their South African 
citizenship.   
 
PEOPLE ARE GIVEN NO CHOICE ABOUT WHO WILL ADMINISTER THEIR 
LAND RIGHTS – INSTEAD TRADITIONAL COUNCILS ARE IMPOSED ON 
THEM. 
 
The bill provides that where traditional councils currently exist, these will become the 
land administration committee responsible for representing the community and carrying 
out ownership and allocation functions in respect of the land.  This is clearly set out in the 
definitions section, which states that a “land administration committee means a traditional 
council, in respect of an area where such a council has been established and recognised; 
and a land administration committee in respect of any other area”.   Section 21(2) 
provides that “if a community has a recognised traditional council, the powers and duties 
of the land administration committee of such community may be exercised and 
performed by such council.”   
 
Unfortunately “may” in this context does not mean that this depends on the community’s 
choice.  No procedure or option for enabling community choice is set out.  “May” in this 
context, merely means that the bill authorises traditional councils to fulfil the powers and 
duties of the land administration committee”. Communities are given no choice about 
who will administer and allocate their land rights.  As long as a traditional council exists 
in the area, it must play this role.   
 
The Traditional Leadership Governance and Framework bill provides that 30% of the 
members of traditional councils must be women, and that a percentage of their members 
must be elected.  Thus perhaps this section will be justified on the basis that traditional 
councils will be different from the Tribal Authorities of old.  However the TLGB is 
fatally flawed in that it contains a “transitional arrangement” which deems pre-existing 
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Tribal Authorities to be traditional councils (25(3)).  While Tribal Authorities are meant 
to transform over time to meet the requirements about women and a percentage of elected 
members, the bill contains no sanction against those that do not.  
 
Tribal Authorities were created by the Bantu Authorities Act, which sparked rural 
rebellions and mass arrests throughout South Africa when it was enacted. The TLGFB 
gives Tribal Authorities perpetual life and the Communal Land Rights Bill gives them 
powers over land that surpass any that they previously enjoyed.  
 
The bill does not vest ownership of the land in Tribal Authorities, it vests ownership in 
“communities”.   However if communities have no choice over who will administer and 
allocate their land rights, then they have no effective means of asserting or protecting 
their land rights against the structure that “represents” them.  The Constitution provides 
that; “The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights” 
(7(2)).  One of the rights in the Constitution is the right to tenure security (25(6)).  Yet the 
bill puts the administration of the right to tenure security in the hands of a structure that 
rural people cannot choose, elect or replace.  What is the point of making the 
“community” the owner of the land if the law imposes a structure on the landowners that 
they have no means of disciplining or replacing?  Chapter 7 abrogates the states duty to 
“respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the right to tenure security.  It also undermines rural 
people’s ability to protect and fulfil their own land rights. 
 
There have been problems of human rights abuse in some Tribal Authority areas for a 
very long time.  Once traditional structures gain legal control over the allocation and 
administration of land rights, they have a guaranteed source of revenue and power far 
beyond anything they have previously enjoyed.  Their traditional functions would be re-
enforced by “land-lord” powers, with the result that those who oppose them could find 
their tenure security threatened.   
 
There is a serious problem of chiefs and headmen charging for “land allocations” in many 
communal areas.  Section 24 is likely to re-enforce this widespread practice because 
24(3) provides that the land administration committee must take measures to ensure the 
allocation and registration of land rights.  Section 24(2) provides that a decision by a land 
administration committee that “has the effect of disposing of communal land or a right in 
communal land”, must first be ratified in writing by the Land Rights Board.  This 
measure was presumably designed to curb the burgeoning practice of informal land sales 
by chiefs and headman.  However there is a grey area about what constitutes land 
allocation and what constitutes disposal.  Often the person who “allocates” the land (for a 
fee) calls it an allocation, while the person who pays, perceives it to be a land purchase.  
Invariably no formal sale or disposal has taken place, because the whole process is 
“informal”, but many “buyers” do not understand this.  Section 24 (2) is not clear enough 
to fix the problem  
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THE BILL DOES NOT PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMUNAL AREAS 
 
The problem of landownership structures abusing land rights in communal areas is 
unfortunately widespread and it is not restricted to traditional structures.  There are also 
many instances of Communal Property Association committee members acting 
unilaterally, treated communally owned land as their private property and evicting 
members or restricting their access to the communal land.   
 
Previous versions of the bill contained provisions that required the community rules 
governing land administration to meet human rights standards.  The content of 
“community rules” is very important.  They determine the powers and functions of the 
land administration committee (24(1)).  They also set out who is entitled to hold new 
order rights (s 5(1)).  The bill does not contain a requirement (as in previous drafts) that 
the majority of the community must agree to the content and adoption of community 
rules.   
 
Nor does the bill clarify who, within the community, will be responsible for driving the 
process of drafting community rules?  Given that the bill requires existing Tribal 
Authorities/traditional councils to fulfill the land administration function, it is likely that 
they will be the bodies that end up drafting community rules. Yet, the TLFGB, which 
creates and regulates traditional councils, repeatedly refers to traditional councils being 
governed by customary law.   
 
The tension between customary law and human rights is well known.  The problem of 
women’s rights under customary law is set out below.   There are other issues as well, to 
do with transparency, accountability and democracy.  One way to handle this tension is to 
acknowledge it, and to set standards that require customary systems and group ownership 
systems to conform with human rights standards over time.  That customary systems are 
flexible and capable of change is evidenced by changes that are already occurring in 
some areas: for example women with children being allocated land by some chiefs and 
headmen. 
 
The state needs to encourage this process of change, and intervene where human rights 
are abused under customary systems or in communal areas.  Tenure systems are a key 
area of interface between custom and the rights set out in the bill of rights.  Yet this draft 
of the bill sets no human rights standards or requirements with regard to land 
administration, nor does it provide for accessible officials to support vulnerable rights 
holders, or to provide recourse where rights are abrogated. 
 
The seriousness of this oversight is borne out by the problems currently being 
experienced by members within Communal Property Associations.  Individual members 
land rights are vulnerable because they struggle to enforce their land rights against CPA 
committees who ignore them.  Ironically it is often easier to enforce rights against the 
state, and to get responses from government officials, if you are poor, than it is to make 
local landownership structures abide by the law.  The only way to enforce land rights 
against a communal ownership structure is to go to court, and most poor rural people do 
 7
not have the resources to do this.  For poor people it is cheaper and easier to lodge a 
complaint at a government office, than to enforce rights through the courts. 
 
THE BILL ENTRENCHES DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN 
COMMUN AL AREAS. 
 
Problems faced by women in communal areas 
Women face serious problems under communal tenure.  Under customary law only men 
are allocated land.  Women can generally access use rights to land only via relationships 
with men.  Wives lose everything at divorce because the land is held by the husband, and 
the marital house attaches to the land.  Furthermore on the death of husbands who have 
not made wills, the land (and thereby house) passes to male relatives; the widow and 
daughters inherit nothing.  The fact that a woman’s access to land is subservient to her 
husband’s is also expressed by the fact that men can, and do, make unilateral decisions 
about how the land should be used during the course of the marriage. 
 
The unequal and discriminatory nature of women’s access to land under customary law 
has been re-enforced by formal law and court decisions.  For example the most common 
record of land rights in communal areas is a PTO.2   Yet the PTO regulations provide that 
PTOs are issued only to men.  Current PTO’s embody ongoing discrimination against 
women. 
 
Another problem relates to customary marriages.  The Black Administration Act (section 
11 (3)) deemed wives in customary marriages to be minors, and subject to their 
husband’s guardianship.  They could not own property or contract in their own right.  
This provision has been repealed, but its legacy remains.  The position is worse in Kwa  
Zulu Natal where customary marriages were not governed by the Black Administration 
Act, but by the Code of Zulu law.  This remains in force and it prevents women from 
being able to acquire property in their own names: they remain legal minors, subject to 
their husbands’ guardianship.     
 
A very serious consequence of the Black Administration Act is the impact on succession.  
The Act provides that “black law and custom” governs intestate succession.  Until the 
recent Cape High Court Bhe judgement this had been interpreted to mean male 
primogeniture.  This has obviously had a major impact on women’s land rights in 
communal areas.  In the first place the PTO regulations reinforced the customary 
prohibition on allocating land to women.  In the second place, property (including land) 
bypasses women on the death of their parents, even if the land belonged to their mother.   
 
The legacy of past discriminatory laws, and the operation of some aspects of customary 
law, has created a situation where most women in communal areas do not have secure 
land rights.  Their position remains vulnerable and unequal.  Not only do they not have 
land rights, but customary practices restrict (and in some cases completely prohibit) their 
right to participate in decision making processes under communal tenure.   What is at 
                                               
2 Permission to Occupy certificate issued in terms of proclamation R188  of 1969 
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issue, is not domestic “family” relations, but structural state sponsored discrimination 
against women. 
 
The tenure system, together with racially specific laws, condemns women, particularly 
rural women, to unequal and subservient land and property rights.  The lack of 
independent property rights and viable alternatives makes women and their children 
vulnerable to abuse, including sexual abuse. 
 
What does the bill do to protect the rights of women in communal areas?  
  
Representation in land administration committees/traditional councils 
The bill provides (via the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework bill) that 
30% of the membership of traditional councils must be made up of women.  The TLGF 
bill also provides that while 40% of the members of a traditional council must be elected, 
the remaining 60% “must comprise – traditional leaders and members of the traditional 
community selected by the principal traditional leaders concerned in terms of custom” 
(3(2)(b)). Thus, apart from those women elected in terms of the 40% portion, the rest of 
the 30% women’s quota will be selected by the “principal traditional leader”, and not by 
women in the community.  As many rural women have pointed out, it is very likely that 
the 30% quota will come from the royal family, and be comprised of female relatives of 
the chief.  Can women handpicked by chiefs really be relied on to represent the interests 
of ordinary rural women, and to address the legacy of gender discrimination against 
women practiced under customary law? 
 
Furthermore, as already stated, existing tribal authorities are deemed to be traditional 
councils.  They are given one year to “transform” to include 30% women and 40% 
elected members.  However what happens if they fail to transform their membership 
within this period?  Neither the TLGF bill, nor the Communal Land Rights bill provides 
that Tribal Authorities who do not include women, will not be entitled to administer 
communal land.  
  
Land allocation 
One of the most serious problems for women in communal areas, is that most traditional 
leaders refuse to allocate land to women.  They justify this on the basis of customary law; 
saying that land can only be allocated to married men.  Yet the bill provides in section 
24(3)(a)(1) that one of the powers and functions of land administration committees (read 
traditional councils) is to “take measures towards ensuring the allocation by such 
committee, after a determination by the Minister, of new order rights…” 
 
Thus the very structures that have consistently discriminated against women in land 
allocation are given the legal authority to allocate land.  (The current legal situation in 
most provinces is that while traditional leaders have the power to recommend land 
allocations, land can only be formally allocated by officials.)    
 
One would anticipate, in this context, that the bill would, at least, contain an explicit 
provision banning discrimination in land allocation, or requiring that women be allocated 
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land on the same basis as men.  The August 2002 version of the bill, which was published 
for public comment had such provisions.  For example the objects of the bill (at section 2 
(h)) included -  
“to provide, in the context of this Act, for the protection of the fundamental human 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, including - 
(i) the right to equality, especially gender equality in respect of the ownership, 
allocation, use of, or access to land; 
 
This object has disappeared from the version of the bill currently before parliament. 
Furthermore section 7 (2) of the August 2002 bill specifically provided that; 
A person or customary or communal system of land tenure may not unfairly 
discriminate against anyone, directly or indirectly, with regard to a community 
rule or practice or decision, which determines – 
(a) the ownership, allocation, occupation, use or alienation of communal 
land for any purpose 
(b) participation in decision-making processes and fora concerned with the 
ownership, allocation, occupation, use or alienation of communal land; 
or 
(c) the membership of any institution of structure involved in the 
management or allocation of rights in the community’s communal 
land. 
 
The current version has no clear provision banning discrimination in land allocation, or in 
the community rules governing land allocation.  Instead it has two obscure and 
ineffective provisions, which the drafters may try to use to justify that the bill is not in 
breach of the constitution.  
  
One of these is section 24(3)(a)(1) which states that land administration committees 
“must take measures towards ensuring the allocation by such committee ….of new order 
rights to persons including women, the disabled and the youth in accordance with law”.  
The question is; what law?  Surely this is the very law that should explicitly provide that 
women must be allocated land on equal terms with men.  Yet nowhere does the bill 
provide that women must be allocated land on the same basis as men.    
 
The bill also says nothing about the rights of others in this category, such as the disabled 
and youth.  It is absurd to include women in the same category as the youth and the 
disabled.  Young people cannot be allocated scarce and valuable land before they have 
established themselves as stable members of the community, and disabled men are 
allocated land.  To lump women into this category is an indication that the specific 
problems faced by women in communal areas, are either not understood, or are not taken 
seriously.   
 
The other ineffective provision that the drafters may try to rely on to defend the 
constitutionality of the bill, is section 19(4)(d).  This provides that the Director General 
may not register community rules if he or she is not satisfied that they comply with the 
requirements of the constitution.   
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The community rules are very important.  They will govern the administration of 
communal land (19(2)) and they govern the ownership and administrative powers of the 
land administration committee.  Yet the bill does not require that community rules may 
not discriminate against women.  Instead it merely says that the Director General cannot 
register rules that he deems inconsistent with the Constitution.  Why not state clearly and 
explicitly that community rules cannot discriminate against women being allocated land?  
It would have been very useful to women challenging dismissed applications to be able to 
point to a provision in the law saying they are entitled to be allocated land on the same 
basis as men.  Previous versions of the bill have explicitly prohibited discrimination in 
land allocation and community rules. What made the drafters remove these provisions?  
Why is there now only the back-handed provision that the Director General may not 
register rules that he deems to be inconsistent with the constitution?  
 
Do the drafters really anticipate that traditional councils are going to write down and 
submit a rule that states they will not allocate land to women?  Can they seriously believe 
that the way to deal with a pervasive discriminatory practice, justified in terms of 
unwritten customary law, is by a provision monitoring written rules? 
 
Participation in meetings and decision making with regard to communal land 
Despite the well known problem of some customary systems banning women from 
attending or speaking at community meetings there is no provision asserting that women 
have the right to participate in decisions affecting communal land.   
 
The registration of “new order rights”   
The bill provides for the transfer of title from the state to “communities”.  It also provides 
for the determination and registration of “new order” rights vesting in individuals on 
communal land.  The title deeds to the land would vest in the “community” but 
individuals living on the land would also have “new order” tenure rights.  The bill 
provides for the conversion of “old order” rights such as PTO’s into registered “new 
order rights”.   As set out above, most existing “old order” tenure rights currently vest in 
men.  
 
Once rights are registered in a specific person’s name this formalises not only that 
person’s rights, but also the exclusion of others who may have informally shared the land 
prior to registration, or had “secondary rights” to the land.  The current de facto exclusion 
of women would be formalised and deepened with the registration of individual rights 
vesting in men.  Where new order rights are transactable (18 (3)(d)), women would be 
doubly vulnerable.  Men could then sell the land from under deserted wives or mothers, 
as a way of realising a profit from land they no longer use or occupy.   
 
Thus there is a real danger that this bill, by formalising and registering individual rights 
within communal areas, could worsen the position of women, by confirming the 
exclusive rights of men, at the expense of the “secondary” rights of women.  Titling and 
registration programmes throughout Africa have often had the unintended consequence of 
weakening the tenure security of women, by registering rights in the name of the 
“household head” - who is generally a man.   
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The bill provides that the Minister “may confer a new order right on a woman – who is a 
spouse of a male holder of an old order right, to be held jointly with her spouse” (s 18 (4) 
(b)). 
 
However this, like so many provisions of the bill, is discretionary.  There is no guarantee 
that the Minister will do so.  There are no criteria setting out under what circumstances 
she must vest or register new order rights jointly in the name of both spouses.  There is 
no requirement that when the state converts old order rights into new order rights, it 
must ensure that the security of tenure of the women who occupy the land is protected.  
There is only a provision enabling the Minister to vest rights jointly if she chooses to do 
so.  This is not good enough.  The state by intervening to upgrade old order rights into 
registered new order rights, will inadvertently worsen the tenure security of women 
relative to men.  Thus a provision to mitigate any negative consequences of the state’s 
intervention must be incorporated into the process to protect the tenure security of 
women.   
 
Section 18(1) provides that when the Minister makes determinations about land and land 
rights she must have regard to various things, including “the old order rights of affected 
rights holders and the need to promote gender equality in respect of land”.  It could 
perhaps be argued that this is sufficient to protect women because the Minister must have 
regard to the need to promote gender equality in respect of land rights, and that the 
“must” in section 18 (1) directs the “may” in section 18 (4) (b). 
 
However there are various problems with this possible interpretation.  The Minister must 
also have regard to “old order rights” - and these generally vest in men.  They vest in men 
because that is what the Black Areas Land Regulations required them to do.  They also 
vest in men because that is how customary law works in practice; men are allocated land 
when they marry and establish families.  Thus it is inevitable that some men will 
challenge the joint vesting of “their” land in the names of their wives – and say that this 
deprives them of the full enjoyment of the “old order rights” that the Minister must also 
take into account.  They could argue that the joint vesting of rights constitutes an 
uncompensated expropriation of their property rights.   
 
This is an inherently complicated issue, as are all issue of vested interests and conflicting 
rights.  What will guide the Minister or her delegate in striking a balance between the 
interests of the holders of old order rights, and the interests of women?  What can she rely 
on to protect her determination against legal challenge by either party?   
 
The bill fails to set out adequate criteria and factors to guide the Minister’s discretion, 
and thereby secure her decisions.  The law could have stated that, insofar as the process 
of formalising and registering rights, may render secondary users (such as women) more 
vulnerable than before, the process must also include special measures to protect the use 
and occupation rights of secondary users (particularly women) against the registered 
owner of the right.   
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It could also have stated directly that one of purposes of the bill is to secure the rights of 
people who use and occupy land on a de facto basis – a “land to the tiller” approach.  
This would have strengthened the position of women, who are de facto users and 
occupiers even when they do not hold “old order” rights. 
 
Another basis to justify the joint vesting of rights is that, insofar as current old order 
rights vest in men, this is as a result of the perversion of customary law.  It has been 
argued that when men are allocated land at marriage, this land is for their wives to use for 
fields and to build houses on.  Each wife in a polygamous marriage should have her own 
separate house and field, to use for supporting her children.  It may be argued that, under 
“proper” customary law, the wife’s right to the land is at least as strong as her husband’s 
and that, indeed, he would not have been allocated it, were he not married to her.   
However customary law has been “perverted” both by the PTO regulations (Proclamation 
R188 of 1969), various court decisions, and by the current practice of allocating land 
rights to men.   
 
The bill fails to address these issues and does not include them as factors to be taken into 
account when balancing “old order rights” and the need to promote gender equality in 
determinations about new order rights.  It is inconceivable that the Minister will be able 
to make determinations in respect of millions of new order rights.  She will have to 
delegate this function.  The bill does not provide sufficiently clear direction or criteria to 
guide those making determinations about land rights.  In this context the fact that the 
Minster “may” confer new order rights on women in section 18 (4) (b) is not strong 
enough to adequately protect the tenure security of rural women.   
 
Instead of the drafters dealing with the difficult issue of women’s land rights 
comprehensively, they have passed the burden to the Minister to decide “at her 
discretion”.  It is not for the Minister, or officials, to determine whether any particular 
rural woman should have land rights on a case by case basis.  It is for the law to set out 
clearly the basis, extent and limits of women’s tenure security in rural areas.    
 
We support the legal opinion submitted by the Commission on Gender Equality that the 
bill is unconstitutional because it does not provide for equality for women in communal 
areas, and because it does not adequately secure the land rights of black women, whose 
tenure is vulnerable as a consequence of racially discriminatory laws and practices.   
 
COMPARABLE REDRESS  - IS THE BILL SERIOUS ABOUT UNPACKING 
OVERLAPPING RIGHTS? 
 
Section 25 (6) of the Constitution provides that:  
 
A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices, is entitled, to the extent provided by an 




This clause creates a constitutional imperative on the government to introduce a law that 
secures tenure rights and that provides “comparable redress” where rights cannot be 
secured in situ because they overlap or conflict with one another.  Communal areas are 
characterised by overcrowding and the overlapping of land rights caused by consecutive 
waves of people being removed or evicted from “white” South Africa and dumped in the 
reserves, often in areas where others had pre-existing rights to the land.    
 
Previous drafts of the bill had extensive provisions dealing with “comparable redress” 
including criteria and procedures for determining how and when it should be awarded.  
The current draft has only two sentences.  The first says that the Minister may award 
comparable redress where she determines that section 25(6) tenure rights cannot be 
secured.  The second says that the Minister may cancel old order rights, but requires the 
consent of the holder of the right.   
 
There is nothing to guide or limit the Minister’s discretion to decide whether pre-existing 
rights can or cannot be secured, and who would qualify, under what circumstances, for 
what comparable redress.  There are no criteria to guide her or his decisions; nothing 
about who should be prioritised: what factors to take into account in determining the 
amount of comparable redress: or how to differentiate between those whose land rights 
should be confirmed in situ, and those who must move away and get comparable redress 
instead.   
 
This would make it virtually impossible for anyone to challenge the decisions of the 
Minister. It would be very difficult for a person to prove that they had a right to 
comparable redress, and it would be impossible to challenge the Minister’s decision on 
the basis that she or he had disregarded particular criteria or historical circumstances.    
 
It is very unlikely that this clause would pass constitutional muster.  The Constitution 
does not require an individual to decide the extent of rights and comparable redress.  It 
requires an Act of Parliament to do so. 
 
The constitutional right to comparable redress provides a key opportunity for the law to 
ensure that tenure reform does not simply confirm the boundaries of past dispossession, 
but has a re-distributive element.  This opportunity is thrown away by the Communal 
Land Rights Bill. 
 
PROBLEMS WITH THE CONTENT OF LAND RIGHTS 
 
The bill gives the minister the power to determine new order rights and to cancel old 
order rights (18(3)(d)).  This is an enormous task.  All the land in communal areas is 
already subject to overlapping claims, interests and rights.  Thus new order rights cannot 
be allocated before the status of old order rights is resolved.  Cancelling old order rights 
will not be a simple task.   
 
In any event what are old order rights?  Who decides whether an old order right exists or 
not?  What is the difference between the content of old order rights and new order rights? 
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What exactly are new order rights?  Section 9 indicates that they are not ownership, but 
nowhere does the bill state what they are.  Section 18 (3) (d) (ii) says that Minister must 
determine the “nature and extent” of such rights.  Section 18(4) says the Minister “must 
determine the holder of or holders of new order rights.”   
 
These sections place a tough, probably impossible burden on the Minister.  One cannot 
help feeling that the drafters having tried and failed to define new order rights, and 
having tried and failed to develop criteria and procedures for transforming current 
interests in land, into legally secure land rights, have simply taken the easy way out, and  
dumped the entire impossible task on the “discretion” of the Minister.   
 
The most striking and absurd provision in the bill is section 4, which states: 
 
An old order right which is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices as contemplated in section 25(6) of the 
Constitution must be legally secured in terms of this Act. 
 
Nowhere does the bill provide for a procedure or criteria to establish whether old order 
rights are legally insecure as a result of apartheid, let alone legally secure them.  All it 
does is give the Minister unlimited discretion to decide these things.  The Constitution 
requires an Act of Parliament to determine the extent of the right to tenure security, 
and the extent of the right to comparable redress.  It does not require an Act of 
Parliament to authorise the Minister to determine (as he or she sees fit) the extent of 
rights in the bill of rights.  
 
On this basis alone the bill is probably unconstitutional.  
 
SERVICE DELIVERY AND DEVELOPMENT BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT 
 
The bill proposes transferring title of large tracts of rural land from the state to 
“communities”.  The effect will be that the land becomes privately owned.  It is well 
known that government does not pay to put infrastructure into privately owned land – it 
takes road, pipes or whatever to the boundaries of private land – internal reticulation is 
the responsibility of the landowner.  This is because the ownership of infrastructure or 
buildings “attaches” to the owner of the land.   
 
Apart from this issue, the experience of the 500 Communal Property Associations 
established since 1996 shows that local government generally refuses to provide services 
on privately owned land – even when this land is communally owned.  Not only is there 
the problem of the ownership of the infrastructure passing to the landowner, there is the 
problem of recovering service costs in areas where local government does not have the 
legal authority to levy residents for costs.  Generally the authority to charge for services 
derives from township establishment laws, which assume state ownership of public 
spaces and individual ownership of residential sites.   
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The danger that transferring title of communal land, may effectively sterilise communal 
areas from service delivery and development has been recognised by the drafters of the 
bill.  New provisions have been inserted to try to address the problem. For example the 
provisions in section 18 (4) (a), which enable the Minister to reserve parts of the 
communal land to the state “including a municipality”.  This would enable parts of the 
communal land to be excluded from the transfer so that the municipality could develop 
rural townships on them.  This is a cumbersome solution to an intrinsic problem – it 
means that prior to every transfer of communal land, a land use planning and consultation 
exercise must have taken place to identify and exclude areas of potential development.  
This will have multiple effects: it will lock land transfers into endless delays; it will put 
land use planning processes under severe pressure, thereby diminishing the possibility of 
proper participatory processes; and often the result will be “wrong” – land will be 
transferred to private ownership that should have been developed – sometimes for 
reasons that will only come to light after the transfers have taken place.   
 
The other new provision is section 37, which states: 
“Despite the other provisions of this Act and the provisions of any other law, no 
law must prohibit a municipality from providing services and development 
infrastructure and from performing its constitutional functions on communal land 
however held or owned.”  
This provision completely misses the point.  It is not because of laws prohibiting them 
from doing so, that government departments and local government are reluctant to install 
infrastructure on privately owned land.  It is for practical reasons to do with losing 
control over the infrastructure when it become the property of the land owner, and the 
difficulties of billing people, and recovering service costs on land which is communally 
owned.   
 
THE BILL CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED AT SCALE 
 
As with the previous drafts many steps have to be followed before land can be transferred 
or rights can be registered.  There must be a rights enquiry, the community must adopt 
and register community rules.  The Minister, in making her determination around 
boundaries, must take into account old order rights, other legislation, the Integrated 
Development Plans of municipalities, and consult with both the Minister of Local 
Government and with municipalities.  Furthermore a communal general plan must have 
been approved, registered and opened, as must have a communal land register.  New 
order rights must have been determined and transferred to the identified people within 
communal areas.   
 
The communal general plan is necessary so that the Minister knows where services are 
likely to go, so that she can reserve this land to the state or municipality and exclude it 
from the land transfer. 
 
However developing a communal general plan entails a massive amount of work that 
combines both an exercise in plotting existing rights and also development planning.  By 
their nature both these processes are intricate and must be undertaken by local institutions 
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with community participation.  The bill requires that a major town planning function 
must take place before formalisation of rights is possible.  This requirement is added to 
the enormous difficulties associated with determining the boundaries of communal land, 
and determining new order rights and whom they vest in.  Boundary disputes alone, will 
tie up land transfers for many years.  
 
Given the existing capacity constraints within the department, and the complex and 
explosive issues at stake, is there really any prospect that the bill could be implemented at 
scale?   Even if the Department managed 100 community transfers a year – a tall order 
given their record with restitution and redistribution projects, it would take 200 years to 
transfer title to all the estimated 20,000 rural communities in South Africa.  
 
What would happen in the interim? 
 
The status of old order rights 
In the first place the status of land rights would remain vulnerable.  The constitution 
requires parliament to enact a law that provides for security of tenure.  Yet old order 
rights will remain for centuries under the schema of the bill.  What is the content of these 
rights?  What is their legal status?  The bill provides no answers.   
 
Land administration 
There are currently serious problems concerning land administration in communal areas.  
In most provinces nobody has the legal power to allocate land rights, and there is no 
budget or staff to survey sites, maintain grazing camps, enforce dipping regimes or 
control the plunder of common property resources such as medicinal herbs and forests.  
Double and disputed land allocations are the order of the day, illegal and informal land 
sales are increasingly common and stock theft has reached alarming proportions.  There 
is a serious and deepening crisis concerning land rights and land allocations in communal 
areas, which is impacting negatively on rural poverty.  One of the results is that investors 
avoid these areas, as it is almost impossible to establish who has what rights, and who to 
deal with in negotiations concerning development.  
 
It has already been argued that there are major problems in imposing un-elected 
traditional councils as land administrators.  However it should be noted that the section 
that vests powers and functions in land administration committees, applies only to 
communities owning communal land (25 (1)).   The yawning vacuum in land 
administration powers, functions and execution remains for areas where title still vests in 
the state.  
 
Development in rural areas  
A fundamental problem in communal areas, is that development initiatives are delayed by 
lack of clarity about the nature of underlying land rights.  
 
The bill does not clarify the nature of existing informal rights to land, instead it prescribes 
a long and cumbersome case-by-case transfer and registration process, that would take so 
long to implement that any development opportunities would be lost during the long wait.  
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Previous drafts of the bill contained a chapter on interim lease provisions that would have 
enabled three way contracts between the Minister, as the nominal owner of the land, the 
community and investors prior to transfer of communal land.  This chapter provided that 
the community must be consulted regarding development initiatives affecting their land 
rights, and that the benefits from the investment must be fairly distributed within the 
community.  However the chapter on interim lease provisions has been scrapped from the 
current draft, and so the obligation on the Minister to consult communities and distribute 
any profits from investment in communal areas, falls away.   
 
3 THE PARADIGM ADOPTED BY THE BILL 
 
Choice? 
Why is the bill so authoritarian?  Why are communities excluded from having any say in 
irrevocable decisions that will impact on their land rights?  Why did the drafters scrap the 
provisions in previous drafts that required community consultation, community consent 
for transfers, choice about land administration structures and human rights standards in 
land rights administration?   
 
When one compares this version of the bill, and the version that was gazetted in August 
2002 it becomes clear that there was a conscious change of direction at some point.  
Consultation, consent and human rights protections were not left out by an oversight.  
They used to be there.  They were taken out. 
 
The reason seems to be that the government has realised that it will not be able to achieve 
its objectives with this bill if rural people are allowed to make choices, and allowed any 
say about the future of their land rights.   This interpretation is consistent with the way in 
which this legislation is being rushed through the parliamentary process – allowing no 
time for rural people to find out about the provisions of the bill before it is enacted.   
 
If rural people had a choice, would they agree to this bill?  We’ll never know because 
they don’t have a choice.  They are not aware of the contents of this bill.  The provision 
giving traditional councils the legal authority to administer communal land, was inserted 
only on the 9th of October 2003. 
 
Rural people are not given a choice about whether they want their land to be administered 
by traditional councils.  The lack of choice – and the fact that councils are imposed – 
implies that the government is not confident that rural people would have chosen 
traditional councils to administer their land rights of their own free will.   
The same applies to land transfers.  Why is the consent of the people whose land rights 
are at issue, no longer required?  Is it because of the provisions that authorise the Minister 
to unilaterally exclude portions of communal land?  Is it because the government is aware 
that the transfer process will generate boundary disputes on an unprecedented scale?  Or 
is the government worried that, given the choice between service delivery and 
infrastructure on state owned land, or privately owned land managed by chiefs, rural 
people would choose the former?   
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The government’s objectives 
The government is faced with a very difficult situation and a constitutional imperative to 
intervene and secure tenure rights.  The approach it has adopted is to transfer title from 
the state to “communities”, and to transfer the responsibility for land administration from 
itself onto Tribal Authorities, or traditional councils, as they will be renamed.  Its 
motivation seems to be an attempt to absolve itself of its legal responsibility for land 
rights in communal areas and an attempt to absolve itself of the responsibility and 
expense of administering communal land rights effectively.  The bill does not provide 
that the Traditional Councils who take over this government function, will receive any 
funding whatsoever.   
 
If this bill is enacted rural people will not be able to enforce their land rights against the 
state, they must attempt to enforce their land rights against “communities” and traditional 
councils.  Not an easy task - as indicated by the experience with the 500 Communal 
Property Associations created since 1996 – and the decades spent under Tribal 
Authorities during apartheid.   
 
Furthermore communal land will become privately owned, and it is notoriously difficult 
for poor people living on private land, to secure services or development from the state.   
 
This bill pulls the plug on rural people living in communal areas.  
 
4 THE ALTERNATIVE 
 
Turn the process around and begin by securing rights 
The current structure of the bill creates many problems and would be very difficult to 
implement at scale.  Why not turn it around and begin by securing individuals rights, 
rather than have this as the end product of a time consuming and unrealistic process?  The 
alternative would be for the bill to recognise existing use rights in land and convert them 
into property rights on a blanket basis.  People would immediately get legal protection for 
existing use and occupation rights.  The process of defining and registering users and 
plots or fields would take place on an incremental basis, as and when the need arose in 
specific areas.   
 
Furthermore whilst the initial “blanket” creation of rights would secure existing land uses 
and so “hold the status quo” and secure people from eviction, at the second stage, that of 
defining and registering rights, the “comparable redress” process would “kick in”.  It 
would be counter productive (and so contentious as to be impossible) to formalise and 
record rights that overlap on the same land.  Thus, in situations of overlapping land 
rights, the comparable redress investigation and award process would take place prior to 
the formalisation of rights.   
 
Measures to secure rights should be complemented by provisions to support and regulate 
group management of common property resources, allocation processes, dispute 
resolution and other land matters of common concern.  There is no contradiction between 
strong individual rights and communal systems.  Individual rights have always existed 
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and will always exist within communal areas.  The more clearly the rights of individuals 
are defined and understood, (including exclusive use rights to homestead plots, shared 
rights to grazing land, and procedural rights to participate in group management 
decisions), the better group based systems work.   
 
Vesting rights in people as opposed to institutions 
A very serious problem with many communal systems is that the structure representing 
the community begins to act as the owner of the land, and disregards the rights and views 
of the members or residents.  The structure begins to treat the land as its private asset and 
may even threaten residents with eviction if they challenge it, or refuse to “pop out” 
levies and other contributions.  Abuse of power is unfortunately common both in CPAs 
and in some traditional authorities.   
 
Where property rights are vested in the occupants, as opposed to in a structure or 
institution, the institution has to be responsive to the rights holders in order to survive.  
The rights holder are able to choose which people or institution they want to manage their 
land rights, and to replace it if they are not satisfied with its performance.  The issue is 
not simply one of choice.  It is one of power.  The power over communal land should not 
vest in institutions, it should it vest in the people who use and occupy the land, thereby 
giving them real authority over the institutions that purport to represent them. 
 
Maintaining state responsibility for service delivery and development 
This approach of vesting rights in occupants and users has another key benefit, which is 
that it would not be necessary to transfer underlying title away from the state.  The land 
could remain nominally state-owned with strong statutory rights for residents.  This does 
away with all the difficulties of service delivery and development on private land.  The 
government would continue to be a key stakeholder in rural areas, while the residents 
would have secure statutory rights.   
 
However this model should not preclude the option that should people opt for transfer of 
title to their residential sites, or should groups opt for communal title, the transfer option 
should remain available, but on the basis of informed choice.  
 
Maintaining state responsibility for land administration 
Finally, experience with both Communal Property Associations and with Sectional Title 
schemes has shown the danger of underestimating the support necessary to make group 
based tenure systems work effectively and fairly.  The rural provinces have been 
neglected and under resourced for decades.  Ongoing decentralised support from 
government is necessary both to ensure that the any new tenure system is properly 
implemented, and to assert and protect the rights of vulnerable groupings such as women 
and the very poor.  The current draft of the Communal Land Rights Bill, does not provide 
for any ongoing administrative support, or recourse where rights are abrogated.  It 
provides instead for ad hoc interventions to facilitate land transfers of large tracts of land 
to big groups of people.   
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It is a normal role for governments around the world, to secure, support and maintain 
systems of property rights.  If the majority of citizens of a country are excluded from 
appropriate, affordable and effective systems of tenure rights, an inherently unstable 
situation is created, leading to cycles of land occupation and eviction become inevitable.  
Secure tenure, together with a degree of stability and predictability are pre-requisites for 
sustainable development. 
 
Integrated tenure reform 
There is an urgent need for tenure reform, not just in the communal “reserves”, but also 
throughout South Africa.  For many people freehold title is inaccessible and too 
expensive to maintain.  Many communal tenure institutions are in trouble, others are not 
recognised, but operate in practice, for example street committees “authorising and 
witnessing” informal land sales in RDP townships.  Increasing numbers of people simply 
cannot afford the high transfer costs associated with acquiring, maintaining and 
bequeathing individual title, so they resort to informal transactions and institutions and 
fail to transfer title to heirs on the death of the registered owner.   
 
People in all these categories would welcome a cheaper and simpler tenure option that 
provides secure high content land rights for individuals, together with systems of group 
management and control over common property resources, allocations or sales, and 
dispute resolution.  Such an option would require an ongoing role for government in 
maintaining and guaranteeing registers of individual rights, as well as providing locally 
accessible recourse to deal with instances of abuse by group management institutions.   
 
The Communal Land Rights bill sends us in the opposite direction.  It is not a unitary 
measure.  It is a “special” measure for one race group and one category of land.  It 
isolates areas and solidifies boundaries.  It does this not only between communities, but 
also between the old “reserves” and the rest of South Africa.  The areas that the bill 
targets are severely overcrowded and eroded.  The people living there need to expand 
into the rest of South Africa, not be boxed into old colonial boundaries.  By focussing 
only on these areas the bill further isolates the “reserves” from the rest of South Africa.  It 
rearranges tenure relations within this area rather than expanding and integrating it with 
the rest of the country.   
 
WAY FORWARD  
 
To develop an appropriate tenure reform law – it is necessary to first reach agreement on 
the problems that the law seeks to address.  What are the burning problems experienced 
by rural people living in communal areas?  What do rural people want from tenure 
reform?  
 
This is the question that should be moved to centre stage.  We propose that the bill be 
shelved and that that a Commission be established to investigate the problems in 
communal areas, and establish the views of rural people about land rights and tenure 
reform.  
 
